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AIDS AND GOVERNMENT:
A PLAN OF ACTION?
Taunya Lovell Banks*
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office. 1988. Pp. xix, 201. $11.
A recent New York Times article noted that "[a]mong the changes
wrought during the Reagan years, few may turn out to be so profound
and irreversible as the reshaping of health care." 1 Now more than
ever before, budgetary considerations significantly constrain major
health care decisions. 2 Yet in contrast to the Reagan administration's
usual miserly attitude on health care spending, the final Report of the

Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic argues that as much as $3 billion must be spent annually over
the next ten years if the epidemic is to be stemmed (p. 171). President
Reagan's final AIDS budget request for fiscal year 1990 was $1.4 billion short, although the Office of Management and Budget estimates
that $2.1 billion will be spent on AIDS in fiscal year 1990. 3 Indeed,
the obstacles to success identified by the report reflect a far broader
failure on the part of American society to provide adequate access to
health care for the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals
with chronic diseases. Not surprisingly, the Commission chair, in a
portion of the draft unfortunately omitted from the final commission
report, calls for a revamping of this country's health care delivery
system.4
• Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. B.A. 1965, Syracuse University; J.D. 1968, Howard University. - Ed.
1. Malcolm, In Health Care Policy, the Latest Word Is Fiscal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at
E3, col. 1.
2. A major change came with the overhaul of the Medicare payment system five years ago.
The government established Diagnostic Related Groups, or DRGs, a system in which the prices
Medicare would pay for almost 500 different types of ilJnesses and treatments was set by the
government. Hospitals complained because these prices often did not allow them to make any
profit. The Reagan administration also set up peer review organizations whereby some treatments were approved in advance and reviewed afterward for cost containment purposes. Id.
3. Johnson, The View on AIDS: Money Will Tell Much, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, at E24,
col. 1.
4. As an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association noted, "the ... final
report contains a section that-essentially is urging nothing less than revamping some of the health
care system in the United States." AIDS Recommendations Leave Federal Officials to Ponder:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 260 J. A.M.A. 16 (1988). The editorial was referring to chapter
12 of the draft final commission report which contained Admiral Watkins' personal assessment
of the AIDS epidemic and which the full Commission ultimately reduced to two pages.
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In June 1987, President Ronald Reagan, vowing to "send AIDS
'the way of smallpox and polio' " 5 issued an executive order creating
the Commission. 6 The commissioners were officially designated in
September 19877 and ordered to submit a preliminary report to the
President in ninety days. 8 But the Commission almost fell apart
before it started. Reports circulated that its chair, Dr. W. Eugene
Mayberry, chief executive officer of the Mayo Clinic, was a poor
leader. 9 First he was forced by other Commission members to oust
Linda D. Sheaffer, a government health officer who had been appointed by Mayberry as the Commission's executive director. 10 Then
three weeks later Dr. Mayberry, along with the Commission's vice
chair and only staff physician, abruptly resigned without explanation.11 Dr. Mayberry was immediately replaced by James D. Watkins,
a retired admiral and former Chief of Naval Operations. 12
To the surprise of many, under Admiral Watkins' leadership the
Commission submitted a preliminary report to the President in December 1987 outlining its plan of action. 13 After hearing testimony
from more than 200 people, the Commission identified four critical
issues which would be the subject of its interim report: (1) the need
for reliable information about the incidence and prevalence of HIV;
(2) the need for out-of-hospital patient care programs at the local level;
(3) new drug development and availability; and (4) the problem ofsubstance abuse and HIV. 14 Admiral Watkins' transmittal letter said that
5. Boffey, Panel on AIDS Turns Voices of Criticism Into Songs ofPraise, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,
1988, at Al, col. 1.
6. Exec. Order No. 12,601, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (1987).
7. Transmittal letter from James D. Watkins to President Reagan (Sept. 2, 1987), Interim
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic.
8. Exec. Order No. 12,201, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Boffey, U.S. Panel on AIDS, Citing Challenges, Ousts Staff Chief, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 1987 at Al, col. 4. Another article written after the release of the final commission
report strongly suggests that Mayberry's successor, Admiral Watkins, was a catalyst for the
change in leadership. It was reported that Watkins expressed concern at the first commission
meeting that no executive director had been hired, no plan of action developed, and no back·
ground information prepared for the commissioners who had known little about HIV before
their appointment. After the meeting Watkins left for Miami, but some other commissioners met
for dinner and talked about proposing Watkins as a replacement for Mayberry. Squires, The
Admiral Who Took on AIDS, Wash. Post, June 20-26, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (national weekly ed.).
10. Boffey, supra note 9.
11. Boffey, Executive Director Named for President's AIDS Commission, N.Y. Times, Oct.
14, 1987, at B8, col. 2; Boffey, Panel on AIDS Turns Voices of Criticism into Songs ofPraise, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Boffey, Panel on AIDS]. Later reports suggest
that Dr. Mayberry's resignation was prompted by his realization that he could not rnn the Com·
mission from Minnesota. Because he spent most of his time in Minnesota and knew little about
Washington, Commission members felt that the Commission lacked strong leadership and focus.
Boffey, Panel on AIDS, supra.
12. Boffey, Panel on AIDS, supra note 11.
13. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU·
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (Dec. 12, 1987).
14. Id. at 17-23. There was some criticism about the Commission's focus on the prevalence
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the four issues "cr[ied] for early resolution."1 5
I.

THE INTERIM REPORT

In March 1988 the Commission submitted its interim report.t6
That report covered only three of the four previously identified areas:
intravenous drug abuse, patient care, and research and drug development.17 Citing the need to curb drug abuse as "imperative to deter the
progression of the HIV epidemic," the report called for an additional
$1.5 billion a year for ten years to provide treatment on demand for
intravenous drug users. 18 That sum almost equalled the Reagan administration's total 1989 AIDS budget request for the U.S. Public
Health Services.t9
The report also pointed out that many people believe the health
care delivery system as currently structured and financed fails to provide adequately for the needs of people with HIV and other chronic
illnesses. 20 This conclusion does not surprise those familiar with
America's health care delivery system. The same concerns have been
expressed by others, including previous presidential commissions.21
of HIV. For example, Jeffrey Levi, executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, thought that "[t]rying to decide the real level of AIDS-virus seroprevalence in this country is not the role of this commission. They don't have the expertise. . . . That should be left to
scientists .•.." AIDS Commission's Next Report Focuses on Four Critical Issues, 259 J. A.M.A.
169-70 (1988) [hereinafter Four Critical Issues].
15. Four Critical Issues, supra note 14, at 169.
16. INTERIM REPORT PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC (Mar. 15, 1988) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
17. Id. at 1. The Commission determined that it would be premature to make recommendations about the incidence and prevalence of HIV at this stage since other issues like testing,
confidentiality, and discrimination "are closely intertwined with collecting such data." /d.
18. Id. at 6. The report suggested that, as an interim emergency measure, minimal service or
holding clinics may be needed. /d. at 7. It also pointed out that addicted women of childbearing
age need programs to address their special needs. /d. The report noted that it would be difficult
to formulate a sound policy since data on the drug abusing community is not being collected in
any uniform manner. Id. at 12.
19. Fineberg, The Social Dimension of AIDS. 259 Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 128, 132. "Total
Federal expenditures for AIDS in fiscal 1989 are projected to exceed $2 billion" and include:
$400 million for the Centers for Disease Control and $600 million for the National Institutes of
Health to cover scientific research, disease surveillance, prevention, and control measures. An
additional $600 million was requested to pay the federal share of patient care provided through
Medicaid, but this amount should not be included in the total AIDS expenditures since it is not
calculated in expenditure totals for other diseases like cancer. Id.
20. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 28; see a/so 1 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACKS AND MINORITY HEALTH
(1985) (Executive Summary) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT ON BLACKS AND MINORITY
HEALTH] (excessive deaths of minorities from cancer and cardiovascular disease).
21. See, e.g., 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF
HEALTH SERVICES 88, 97-98 (1983) (racial and ethnic minorities and the indigent traditionally
have been denied access to adequate health care); A. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET (1985); SECRETARY'S REPORT ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH, supra note 20, at 17-18 (more blacks
and Hispanics than whites have no usual source of medical care). In September 1988 a panel of

HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1323 1988-1989

1324

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1321

To the surprise of many, the interim report recommended that an
additional $1.6 billion, $924.5 million in federal funds alone, be spent
to deal with the three areas discussed. 22 A few commissioners expressed concern that government might not be willing to spend this
kind of money, and recommended that the panel eventually prioritize
its recommendations to guide public officials in deciding which expenditures were most important. 23 In justifying the large expenditures, the Commission indicated that HIV-related basic research is
expected to result in beneficial discoveries to aid in the treatment and
cure of other diseases. 24
The interim report estimated that implementation of its recommendations would cost $2.2 billion per year. Yet a commitment to
that level of spending seemed unlikely, given the Reagan administration's policy of reduced spending for domestic health-related programs. 25 With a growing national debt and a public set against a tax
experts, in a 218-page report, The Future ofPublic Health, commissioned by the National Acad·
emy of Sciences, "expressed 'great concern and some alarm' that the nation's public health programs had fallen into disarray." Boffey, Panel Finds U.S. Failing in Safeguarding Health, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at Bl3, col. 1. The panel concluded that there has been an "erosion of
support, weak leadership and disorganization," but said this problem "could not be attributed to
any one Presidential administration." The panel said that a major overhaul of the public health
system was needed so that each state health department would have more control over all health·
related functions. /d.
22. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 75. The report recommended $1.5 billion for treatment services ($750 million in federal funds and $750 million in state funds); $18 million in
federal funds for treatment research; $30 million in federal funds for drug abuse prevention; and
$126.5 million in federal funds for outreach education. /d. Specifically, the report recommended
that $20 million federal dollars be appropriated to provide primary medical and dental care for
persons infected with HIV. An additional $50 million in federal and matching state funds was
recommended to assist community-based organizations develop housing and day care facilities
and other support services for people infected with HIV. /d. at 29. A total of $25 million in
federal and state matching funds was recommended for home health care. /d. at 30. $25 million
was recommended for hospice or other long-term care for patients from ages twenty to forty
since, as the Commission recognized, most long-term institutional care in this country is
designed for the elderly. /d. at 31. $35 million was recommended for medical services for HIVinfected infants. $20 million in federal and state funds was recommended for infant foster care
programs; $5 million in federal funds for pediatric demonstration projects; and $10 million in
federal funds for demonstration comprehensive family care centers in regions with a high prevalence of HIV infection. /d. at 30-31.
23. Boffey, AIDS Panel Backs Wide Drive in U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at B5, col. 1.
24. "HIV-related basic research is expected to have high yield benefits to Americans who
suffer from cancer, viral diseases, and immune diseases, which collectively kill an estimated
650,000 individuals each year." P. 38.
25. For example, as the interim report points out, the problems of minority and underserved
communities disproportionately affected by the HIV infection were made worse by the elimination of National Health Service Corps (NHSC) physician scholarships in 1981. The NHSC had
been created in 1970 to provide primary medical care to isolated or underserved areas and to
people who, due to economic or geographical barriers, race, language, culture, or other constraints, do not have access to basic health care. Most of the NHSC physicians work in Community Health Centers, Migrant Health Centers, and Indian Health Services. The program reached
its peak in 1986 with an enrollment of 3200 providers. Yet because the Reagan administration
was phasing out the program, less than 100 NHSC providers will be available in 1994 compared
to the current enrollment of2800. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 16, at 40. In addition, the new
loan repayment plan established by Congress in 1987 is not expected to substantially alleviate the
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increase, many doubted that the recommendations would bring about
any meaningful change.
II.
A.

THE FINAL REPORT

Major Recommendations

Stressing its attempt to strike the "proper balance" between society's obligation toward diseased and nondiseased persons, the Commission submitted its final report to the President on June 24, 1988.
The report contains 600 recommendations on a wide range of topics
- discrimination, nursing shortages, therapeutic drug development,
intravenous drug abuse, and education. While two-thirds of the recommendations are new, the report also includes some topics covered
in the Commission's interim report. The Commission lists its most
important findings in the Executive Summary, emphasizing the need
to (1) provide accessible, confidential, voluntary testing accompanied
by "appropriate counseling"; (2) treat HIV as a disability, whose victims deserve strong legal antidiscrimination protection; (3) formulate
stronger confidentiality standards at both the federal and state levels
to protect those persons infected with HIV; (4) institute immediate
confidential partner notification by public health officials for sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV, and notification of all persons
who have received blood transfusions since 1977 that they may need to
be tested; (5) make prevention and treatment of intravenous drug and
alcohol abuse "a top national priority"; (6) provide drug and alcohol
abuse education to school children; (7) provide scholarships and other
financial assistance for nursing education; (8) expand and extend the
National Health Services Corps and recruit more minority health professionals; (9) give NIH greater administrative flexibility to aggressively pursue biomedical research; (10) provide "more equitable and
cost-effective financing of care for persons with HIV"; (11) provide
health professionals with complete information about HIV, adequate
protective materials, and a safe work environment; and (12) further
problem, since it will create only forty new providers and return to service a number of earlier
scholarship recipients. /d. at 40-41.
The Reagan administration was unwilling, until very recently, to even target HIV-related
programs to the black and Latino communities. See, e.g., Nickens, AIDS, Race, and the Law:
The Social Construction ofDisease, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1179 (1988). For example, as noted by the
Commission, transfusion-exposed individuals, women, and children (most of whom are black
and Latino) have generally been excluded from the HIV drug clinical trials. P. 56. '
As another commentator points out:
[W]hen NIH did take up the problem of AIDS, research funding was inadequate. In 1982
and 1983 the administration did not budget any money for AIDS research; nevertheless,
Congress allocated $33 million. The following year, the administration asked for $39 million. Congress appropriated $61 million. In 1986, Congress allocated $234 million, but the
Reagan administration proposed cutting this to $213.2 million; this, despite the fact that
cases have been doubling every year.
Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 238
(1986).
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education efforts to emphasize that HIV can be transmitted heterosexually (pp. xvii-xix).
A cornerstone of the final Commission report is the recommendation to combat discrimination against those who are infected with
HIV. According to the report:
HIV-related discrimination is impairing this nation's ability to limit
the spread of the epidemic. . . . Public health officials will not be able to ·
gain the confidence and cooperation of infected individuals or those at
high risk for infection if such individuals fear that they will be unable to
retain their jobs and their housing, and that they will be unable to obtain
the medical and support services they need because of discrimination
based on a positive HIV antibody test. [p. 119]

News accounts of the report highlighted its recommendation for a new
federal law to protect persons infected with HIV from discrimination
in employment, housing, and health insurance. 26 In the past, the Reagan administration and many conservative members of Congress stiffly
opposed extending federal antidiscrimination protection, believing
such measures should be left to the states. 27
Another cornerstone recommendation is that new federal and state
confidentiality laws be enacted to encourage more people to volunteer
to be tested. 28 The Commission emphasizes voluntary as opposed to
mandatory HIV testing as an effective means of preventing transmission of the virus, but says voluntary measures will fail without adequate confidentiality laws. The recommendation on confidentiality
stresses that identifying information obtained through HIV testing and
counseling should only be disclosed with the written consent of the
individual except in certain very narrowly drawn circumstances. 29
26. See, e.g., Prescriptions Aplenty to Defeat AIDS. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. June 13,
1988, at 7; Botrey, AIDS Panel's Chief Urges Ban on Bias Against Infected, N.Y. Times, June 3,
1988, at A1, col. 6 [hereinafter Botrey, Ban on Bias]; White House Aide Studying AIDS Commis·
sion Recommendations: Reports to President Soon, 260 J. A.M.A. 602 (1988) (pointing out that
the commissioners approved the broadening and extending of antidiscrimination laws by a narrow 7-to-5 margin).
The Commission rejected the notion of providing antidiscrimination protection only for persons suffering with HIV infection, noting that "[f]or the long term, federal legislation which
clearly provides comprehensive antidiscrimination protection for all persons with disabilities, in·
cluding those with HIV infection, is needed." P. 121. The Commission recommended that
"[t]he President ... issue an executive order banning discrimination on the basis of handicap,
with HIV infection included as a handicapping condition." P. 121. The Commission also recommended that the federal disability laws be extended to the private sec~or. P. 123.
27. See Botrey, Ban on Bias, supra note 26. Currently, according to Presidential advisor Dr.
Ian MacDonald, 36 states have Jaws protecting people infected with HIV. Educators Fault Reagan's Hesitation To Endorse Steps Against AIDS Bias, SCHOOL L. NEWS, Aug. 18, 1988, at 5.
28. P. 126. "A federal statute that carefully balances the need for confidentiality of HIV
information against the protection of the public health is a necessary and appropriate response to
confidentiality concerns. . • . In addition, state model confidentiality legislation must be developed and passed as reinforcement to federal confidentiality protection." P. 126.
29. P. 127. More specifically, disclosure would only be required (1) to "members of the
individual's direct care giving team"; (2) to "health care workers accidentally 'exposed to the
blood or blood contaminated body fluids' "; (3) for purposes of "statistical reports if used in such

HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1326 1988-1989

May 1989]

AIDS and Government

1327

Breaches of confidentiality would be classified as misdemeanors under
the federal statute and would be punishable by fines of up to $10,000
(p. 127). The Commission also recommends that any federal confidentiality provision should not be construed as preempting any consistent
state statute, recognizing that a number of states have enacted laws to
protect the confidentiality of HIV test results. 30
Both the discrimination and confidentiality recommendations are
covered in chapter nine of the report, which is devoted to legal and
ethical issues. In this chapter the Commission also addresses the
criminalization of HIV transmission, and HIV transmission in the
context of sexual assault and correctional facilities (pp. 119-40). The
recommendation which is most disappointing for civil libertarians is
that states enact HIV-specific statutes to punish individuals "who
know of their status and engage in behaviors which they know are,
according to scientific research, likely to result in transmission of HIV
... " (p. 131). While several legal writers agree with the Commission's
conclusion that current criminal laws are of limited value in preventing the transmission of HIV, 31 there are similar disadvantages to an
HIV-specific criminal law.32
The report also calls for stricter enforcement of prostitution laws
(p. 131). It lists the lenient and erratic enforcement of prostitution
laws as an obstacle to progress, yet fails to explain how strict enforcement of these laws would help stem the transmission of HIV. The
prostitutes most frequently arrested and subjected to these laws are
women, and medical evidence suggests that female prostitution alone,
at least in the United States, may not be a major mode of HIV transmission. 33 Several studies examining the extent to which female prostitutes in the United States are at increased risk of becoming infected
with and transmitting HIV conclude that the rate of HIV infection
among female prostitutes who are not drug users is minimal, while
a way that no person can be identified"; (4) "to blood, organ, semen, or breast milk banks"; (5)
"to a spouse or sexual partner when the individual will not inform such party"; (6) "by a court
order issued pursuant to application of a state public health officer"; and (7) "to the victim of a
sexual assault." P. 127.
30. P. 27. See Gostin & Ziegler, A Review ofAIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy
in the United States, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 13 (1987) (citing the confidentiality
laws of California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin).
31. See, e.g., Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New
Statutory Proposal, 14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 91 (1985); Field & Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal
Law, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 46 (1987).
32. See generally, Field & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 54-56.
33. The prevalence rate for HIV among female prostitutes in the U.S. ranges between zero
and 65%, with intravenous drug use being the single most important risk factor. This compares
to studies of female prostitutes in East Africa which found a prevalence rate of 65% which
appears to be related only to sex. Rosenberg & Weiner, Prostitutes and AIDS: A Health Department Priority?, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 418, 420-21 (1988); see also Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Female Prostitutes, 257 J. A.M.A. 2011 (1987) [hereinafter Antibody to
HIV].
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female prostitutes who also use intravenous drugs have a higher rate of
infection. At least one writer contends that most female prostitutes
engage in oral sex as opposed to vaginal intercourse with their customers, so that there is minimal risk that they will transmit the virus. 34
Further, female-to-male transmission of HIV is believed to be more
difficult than male-to-female transmission. 35
The Commission's recommendation regarding prostitution laws
seems inconsistent with its own warning "that criminal sanctions for
HIV transmission must be carefully drawn, must be directed only toward behavior which is scientifically established as a mode of transmission, and should be employed only when all other public health
and civil actions fail to produce responsible behavior" (p. 130). Early
in this century, social hygiene reformers and physicians assumed that
women, especially prostitutes, were the primary transmitters of venereal disease. 36 During World War II, prostitutes, "promiscuous" women, and even the "girl-next-door" were often portrayed in Army
posters as the source of venereal disease. 37 The Commission's recommendation only perpetuates the stereotypical assumption that women
are the chief agents of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.
The report further recommends that criminal justice officials,
"under the guidance of public health officials, should develop a mechanism to order that a sexual offender submit to an HIV test at the earliest possible juncture in the criminal justice process" (p. 133).
However, the report does not indicate whether this test is to be performed at the time of arrest, later but still before conviction, or after
conviction. This distinction is extremely important since arguably
mandatory HIV testing prior to conviction might be unlawful infringement upon the suspect's constitutional rights.3 8
Another troubling recommendation is that all convicted sex offenders be tested for the HIV antibody prior to their parole hearing or
release from prison (p. 133). Although the report indicates that a positive HIV test result should not be used as the sole basis for the
abridgement of any right to parole or furlough (p. 135), the Commis34. Decker, Prostitutes os a Public Health Issue, in AIDS AND THE LAw 81, 84 (H. Dalton &
S. Burris eds. 1987).
35. Guinan & Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United States, 251 J. A.M.A.
2039, 2041 (1987); Rosenberg & Weiner, supra note 33, at 421 ("Probability of spread [of HIV)
from women to men remains unquantitated but is probably lower than that from men to women."). The risk of transmission from an infected male to a female is estimated by some to be
0.001 per contact. Rosenberg & Weiner, supra note 33, at 421. The risk of transmission of HIV
is further reduced by the use of condoms.
36. A. BRANDT, supra note 21, at 92.
37. Id. at 167-68 and plates 14, 18, 19, 20.
38. One might argue under the fourth amendment that, absent probable cause, an HIV blood
test would be an invasion of privacy. It is doubtful that probable cause can be established based
on scientific evidence since even the Commission admits that no empirical data exists regarding
the prevalence and incidence of HIV among sex offenders. Pp. 131-32.
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sion believes that "a positive· test result should affect the degree of supervision the sexual offender receives following release [from prison]"
(p. 133). However, despite the Commission's caution, if the parole
board has knowledge of the offender's positive test result, this information may unduly prejudice any decision.
The HIV crisis adds a new dimension to traditional legal problems
like discrimination, insurance, tort liability, health care issues, and
housing. Judging by the number of legal problems mentioned in the
final Commission report, any law professor or student could find an
AIDS-related topic for research in almost any area of the law. 39
B.

Other Recommendations

1. HIV Screening and Testing

The final Commission report makes no mention of one important
screening and testing issue - mandatory HIV antibody testing of applicants and employees by employers. However, the report, emphasizing that testing and counseling should be used primarily as a
prevention strategy to encourage behavior change, sets forth five reasons for HIV antibody testing: (1) to facilitate early clinical diagnosis
of HIV infection; (2) to screen donated blood, organs, breast milk, and
semen; (3) to establish incidence and prevalence data to monitor the
epidemic; (4) to warn sexual partners of their exposure to HIV; and (5)
to use in conjunction with counseling to encourage positive behavior
changes (p. 73). Perhaps the Commission is silent on employer testing
because its outlined justifications do not support the federal government's own current practice of mandatory testing of recruits and
members of the military, peace corps applicants, and State Department employees and dependents.
The Commission also hedges on whether medical authorities
should test a patient who does not consent after being informed that a
health care worker has been exposed to the patient's blood or bloodcontaminated bodily fluids, stating only that "[i]n the unusual case of
denial of consent, competent medical authorities should make the determination whether testing should be done and, if done, should note
the rationale in the medical record" (p. 139). Throughout the report,
the Commission stresses the need for informed consent and counseling
for HIV testing, yet it fails to hold that line here on the grounds that in
this instance the right of the health care worker to know is more im39. Issues one might research include liability problems related to worker safety (pp. 39-40);
ethical issues surrounding the potential exploitation of certain groups participating in vaccine
clinical trials, such as minority and third world populations and intravenous drug users (p. 47);
and liability protection for manufacturers trying to develop vaccines for HIV (p. 47). See also
Weisenhaus, The Shaping Of AIDS Law, Natl. L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1. More than 170
AIDS-related laws have been passed by the states. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1329 1988-1989

1330

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1321

portant than the patient's right to privacy. Yet some hospitals, precisely because the consequences of a positive test result are so severe,
respect the privacy and autonomy of the patient in these situations and
simply do a base line test of the health care worker with periodic
retests. Moreover, testing the patient at the time of the exposure to
the health care worker will not necessarily reveal that the patient is
infected, because there is a window period between the time of the
patient's exposure and the time that antibodies to HIV are detectable
by current HIV tests. Hedging on such an important question will not
make it go away.40
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) takes a, clearer stand on HIV testing and screening. In a report released simultaneously with the final
Commission report, 10M says that mandatory HIV screening should
be limited to blood, tissue, and organ donations. 41 In fact, 10M believes that the consequences of HIV screening and testing are so serious that formalized rules and regulations are needed in addition to
antidiscrimination and confidentiality provisions.42 On the other
hand, the 10M calls for a conference on the ramifications of routine
HIV antibody testing of health care workers43 and takes no position
on mandatory testing of prisoners.44 10M also concludes that
"mandatory testing of prostitutes at the time of arrest or as a condition
of release is not warranted at this time." 45 Nevertheless, several cities
and states require mandatory HIV testing of prostitutes either at the
time of arrest or as a condition of release. 46
Both the Commission and 10M favor reporting of positive HIV
antibody test results to public health officials. However, the 10M is
against mandatory reporting with identifiers,47 whereas the Commission suggests omitting identifiers only in the context of reporting to the
40. Kristine Gebbie, a member of the Commission, has been quoted as saying: "A lot of
people in this country are just hoping that AIDS will quietly go away, and I'm afraid President
Reagan is one of them." Lichtblau, Reagan Rejects Federal AIDS Anti-Bias Law, L.A. Times,
Aug. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
41. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:
UPDATE 1988 at 10, 75 [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988]. This report is an
update of an earlier report, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES:
CoNFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH
(1986).
42. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 8-9, 71-74.
43. /d. at 15, 101.
44. /d. at 10.
45. /d. at 10; see id. at 78-79.
46. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 78-79; see Antibody to HIV,
supra note 33, at 2012 (Nevada has required monthly screening of prostitutes in licensed brothels
and Florida has required all convicted prostitutes to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases
including HIV); Milne, Two Detroit Judges Mandate AIDS Screening for Prostitutes, Oncology
Times, July 1, 1987, at 16; Narvaez, Newark Moves to Test for AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1988, at B1, col. 4.
47. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 11, 82.
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Centers for Disease Control for incidence and prevalence reasons (p.
4). The Commission does question the Immigration and Nationalization Service's addition in 1987 of HIV to the list of "dangerous contagious diseases" justifying excluding refugees and refusing asylum
except under extraordinary circumstances (p. 156). Rather than condemn the policy, however, the Commission recommends that the policy be reexamined twelve months after its implementation (p. 156).
2. Access to Health Care/Financing Health Care

Previously, Admiral Watkins had been critical of physicians and
dentists who refused to care for persons infected with HIV. 48 However, while the final cominission report indicates. that this problem
continues,49 it fails to take a strong stand on this issue. Th~ Commission reaffirms that health care providers have an ethical' obligation to
"provide care, within the limits of their competencies, to' all persons
who need it, regardless of their HIV status" (p. 137) -,but this recommendation simply repeats the language of the American Medical
Association50 and fails to point out that physicians may in some circumstances be under a legal duty to treat. 5 1 Further, the Commission
ignores the problem of health care providers denying nonemergency
but critical life-sustaining treatment to individuals who lack health
care insurance.
As mentioned previously, a key component of the final commission
report was that much more money needs to be spent to help stem the
transmission ofHIV. 52 The Commission admits that the epidemic has
simply "magnified [the] flaws in the methods and mechanisms of the
health care financing system in this country ... " (p. 141). However, it
devotes only seven pages to the financing issue. The recommendations
contained in chapter ten are merely stopgap measures that do not
squarely address the real problem - an inadequately financed health
care system which is not structured effectively to care·for .the chronically ill, the uninsured working poor, and racial/ethnic minorities, especially minority group members who also fall within one or both of
the preceding categories. 53
48. AIDS Policy in the Making. 239 SCIENCE 1087 (1988) (discussing Watkins' comments at
a meeting with reporters on February 24, 1988).
49. Pp. 136-37; see, e.g., Banks, AIDS and the Right to Health Care, 4 ISSUES IN LAW &
MED. 151, 151-52 (1988); Gianelli, Issue of AIDS Control vs. Civil Rights Explored at Commission Hearings, Am. Med. News, May 27, 1988, at 2, 4.
50. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 99 (the American Medical
Association adopted a policy statement in 1987 that "a physician 'may not ethically refuse to
treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's current realm of competence' merely
because the patient has AIDS or is seropositive" (citation omitted)).
51. See generally Banks, The Right To Medical Treatment, in AIDS AND THE LAw, supra
note 34, at 175-81.
52. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
53. See CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 16, 110-11.
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Once again 10M has more comprehensive recommendations to
deal with the financing problem. Perhaps this reflects a fundamental
difference in philosophy between IOM and the Commission. While
the Commission is trying to "end up with a better system which will
be more responsive, more humane, and more able to direct its manifest
strengths quickly and efficiently to where they are most needed" (p.
17), 10M believes "that all individuals have a right to equitable access
to adequate medical care and that society has an ethical obligation to
ensure such access." 54 10M consequently recommends four principles
to be used in developing any kind of financing strategy: (1) coverage
should begin at the time of HIV infection; (2) special consideration
should be given to "hard-hit" communities; (3) the public and private
sectors should share responsibility for financing medical care; and (4)
payment proposals should encourage "cost-effective" care. 55
While both reports agree that more effort should be directed at
minimizing transmission of HIV among intravenous drug users and
their sexual and needle-sharing partners, there are significant differences. Both groups endorse the expansion of drug abuse treatment
programs, 56 a long-term and costly strategy, but 10M additionally
proposes some immediate intervention programs such as instruction in
the use of bleach to sterilize drug equipment and the distribution of
sterile needles to drug users. 57 Likewise, both reports agree that
clinical drug trials need to be broadly available to minorities, women,
IV drug users, and children in a wide range of geographical areas. 58
But the Commission recommends community-based clinical trials (pp.
56-59), while 10M favors clinical trials "within well-established sites
for drug testing." 59 Traditionally women of child-bearing age have
been denied access to clinical drug trials because of alleged harm to
the reproductive system and hormonal differences between men and
women. The blanket exclusion of women is unjustified, since male reproductive systems can also be harmed by experimental drugs; if there
are hormonal differences between women and men, separate trials for
54. Id. The 10M report states:
The problems of financing care for persons with AIDS and other HIV-related conditions
reflect the inequities in the entire U.S. health care system in relation to the uninsured and
uninsurable, the plight of the poor in getting care, continuing underfunding for disease prevention, insufficient capabilities for care outside of institutions, and inadequate care for the
chronically ill.
/d.; see also id. at 110-11.
55. /d. at 17, 118.
56. Seep. 95; see also CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 12, 84.
57. See CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 12, 85-87.
58. See pp. 54-59; CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 136-40.
59. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 140. 10M believes that
"[c]ommunity-based trials need to be carefully supervised to yield useful results" and should be
used only at the final phase of the trials. /d.
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women are a more appropriate response. 60
C.

Government's Response to the Epidemic

In February 1988, shortly before the release of the interim report,
Admiral Watkins admitted in a meeting with reporters that the Reagan administration had not developed a national policy for AIDS. 61
Neither the interim nor the final commission report contains criticism
of the Reagan administration. Critical references to the Reagan administration in the final draft that Admiral Watkins submitted to the
Commission were deleted when the final version was supmitted to the
White House. 62 Nevertheless, criticism of some units of the federal
government appear in several sections of the report. 63 Few would
deny that to date many states have been much more deeply involved in
60. COMMITIEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIQNS, AIDS DRUGS: WHERE ARE THEY?,
H.R. REP. No. 1092, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1988).
61. AIDS Policy in the Making, supra note 48. He suggested that the Commission was developing a policy.
62. The chapter of the draft report entitled, "Guidance for the Future: The Establishment of
a Public Health Emergency System Within the Federal Government," contained the following
language which is not found in the final version:
The Federal Government has not yet established a unified comprehensive discrete policy in
response to the HIV epidemic. Rather, various policy statements and individual department
policies have emerged throughout the Federal Government, and mostly in relation to ongoing activities within the agencies or circumscribed aspects of the epidemic.
The bureaucratic procedures of the Federal Government have acted as an impediment to.
a timely response to the HIV epidemic. Agency requests for increased personnel, facilities
and funding have been repeatedly thwarted, leaving many agencies to respond by stealing
personnel and resources from other functions. Many of the decisions about the Federal
response the [sic] the HIV epidemic appear to have been made on the basis of criteria other
than medical and scientific data about the needs of persons with HIV infection and AIDS or
future projections about the epidemic. Rather, in some instances bottom line personnel ceilings and overall Government target budget figures appear to have driven the Federal Government's response to the epidemic. Quick decisions based on n·ewly discovered facts about
the HIV epidemic have been virtually impossible.
The commission is deeply concerned about the Federal Government's slow response to
the HIV epidemic and believes that it is incumbent upon the Federal Government and the
Congress to establish a public health emergency response mechanism for the future. With
such a mechanism in place, the Federal Government would have the capacity to shift gears
and move immediately into an emergency mode which would allow for quick decisions and
a capacity to respond to emerging data and knowledge in a timely fashion, thus preventing
unnecessary loss of life.
Excerpts/rom Report by AIDS Panel Chairman, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1988, at Al6, col. 3; cf ch.
12, "Guidance for the Future," in the final commission report at p. 157.
63. For a sampling of these criticisms, see p. 34 ("The Department of Labor should move
expeditiously to develop a permanent and enforceable standard covering blood-borne diseases";
p. 41 ("[A]s stated in the Commission's interim report, a greater sense of urgency throughout the
government is needed to implement the increased .funds already approved by Congress and to
supplement improvements already underway...."); p. 66 ("CDC has lagged behind scientific
understanding by not moving to an HIV infection-based data collection system when the antibody test was developed in 1985 to detect infection in asymptomatic persons"); p. 69 ("OMB
should not undermine congressional intent"); p. 120 ("There is a Jack of coordinated leadership
from our public and private institutions on the issue of discrimination against persons with HIV
infection. . . . Enforcement of existing anti-discrimination Jaws is slow and ineffective.").
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the development of AIDS legislation and policies than has the federal
government.
10M also criticizes the uneven federal response and "the absence
of strong federal leadership" in the fight against HIV. 64 However,
10M commends Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's efforts to fight
the epidemic. 65 Its report also calls for strong federal antidiscrimination laws to protect persons infected with HIV and encourage them to
seek treatment. 66 10M echoes the Commission's concern that educational efforts should be effectively targeted to racial and ethnic minorities who are at great risk of infection. 67
Another controversial recommendation by Admiral Watkins
which was not included in the final commission report was that the
President designate the Surgeon General as the federal government's
principal spokesperson in health care emergencies and give him authority to develop effective public policy in a speedy fashion. 68 The
final version of the report favors "some special management oversight
entity" to be responsible for seeing that an action plan is carried out. 69
The Commission also recommends establishing an independent federal
Department of Health. 70 10M, on the other hand, reaffirms its 1986
recommendation that a national commission on HIV infection and
AIDS be established to assume a clearly spelled-out advisory role. 7 1
Ill.

THE GOVERNMENT'S REsPONSE To THE REPORT

Instead of endorsing the Commission's recommendations immediately, President Reagan appointed White House drug policy advisor
Dr. Ian MacDonald to develop a course of action within thirty days. 72
Ulti_mately, the President set forth a ten-point action plan that stopped
64. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24-25. See generally R. SHILTS,
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLmCS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987); S. PANEM,
THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY (1988), for a more detailed discussion of the government's response
to the HIV epidemic.
·
65. CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24.
66. Id. at 6, 62-64.
67. Id. at 67-68. •
68. Boffey, Ban on Bias, supra note 26, at A16, col. 3.
69. P. 157. The Commission sets up a two-pronged management system: an external sevenperson committee responsible for ongoing evaluation, and a single designated official to mannge
the implementation of the report Within existing government structures. P. 158. At least one
news article characterized Admiral•Watkins' proposal as creating an "AIDS cznr." Trnfford &
Thompson, The Muddled State ofAIDS Policy, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1988, at 16 (Health). Interestingly, the other Commission members rejected the concept of an AIDS cznr - but Congress
subsequently created a "drug cznr."· See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
70. P. 158. The Commission also recommends that chief health officials have expanded powers in times of public health emergencies.
71. CoNFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, supra note 41, at 24-26. The commission would
have a five-year, renewable term. Id. at 25.
72. Johnson, Report by AIDS Panel Gets Muted Reaction by Reagan, N.Y. Times June 28,
1988, at A16, col. 1.
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short of adopting the Commission's recommendations on antidiscrimination protection for persons with HIV. Instead he ordered federal agencies to adopt guidelines to prevent dis.crimination in the
workplace against persons with HIV and directed the Attorney General to "conduct an expeditious review" of the Commission's antidiscrimination recommendations. 7 3
The Justice Department, following the Commission's recommendation (p. 123), subsequently issued a legal opinion reversing its earlier
1986 memorandum on the application of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (as amended) 74 to persons infected with HIV. 75 The
new memorandum follows the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 76
The President also called upon schools and businesses to "examine
and consider adopting education and personnel policies" using the
guidelines prepared by the federal Office of Personnel Management
and Centers for Disease Control. 77 However, this attempt to, in effect,
extend federal HIV workplace policy to the private sector was criticized for being less effective than the executive order recommended by
the Commission. 78
The President's ten-point program also ordered: (1) the Department of Health and Human Services to set up conferences on AIDS
public health issues; (2) the Food and Drug Administration to improve the procedures and accuracy of HIV blood tests; (3) accelerated
development, approval, and distribution of vaccines and treatments;
and (4) accelerated approval of AIDS budget requests. All of these
measures were recommended by the Commission. The President
avoided addressing the Commi!!sion's recommendation on increasing
the number of drug treatment centers to facilitate treatment on demand, but Congress subsequently appropriated money for the construction of drug treatment centers. That drug bill also contained a
provision which allows the death penalty for certain drug-related
73. Johnson, Reagan, Spuming Tougher Move, Orders Anti-Bias Rules on AIDS. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1988, at AI, col. 1. "Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Los Angeles), chairman of a House
subcommittee on health, accused the Administration of 'stalling' and said: 'We don't need another study.' " Lichtblau, supra note 40, at 12.
74. 29 u.s.c. 794 (1982).
75. Shenon, Protection for U.S. Workers With AIDS is Widened, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, at
A17, col. 1.
76. 480 u.s. 273 (1987).
77. Johnson, supra note 73, at BS, col. 2.
78. Although Leslye Arsht, a White House spokesperson, indicated that the President's actions had "exactly the same force" as an executive order, opponents contend that an executive
order has symbolic weight and would have to be formally amended or overruled by a subsequent
administration. The President's directive has no such staying power, and could simply be ignored. Id.
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murders. 79 The Commission recommended harsher penalties for both
sellers and buyers of drugs as a "realistic deterrent to drug abuse," but
only mentioned "stiffer sentences, larger fines, and forfeiture of assets
derived from drug trafficking" (p. 102).
In October 1988 Congress passed the first comprehensive AIDS
bill. 80 The measure included legislation on HIV testing, research, and
education. 81 Confidentiality of HIV test results had to be sacrificed to
ensure passage, but the bill does call for anonymous testing. 82 Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for programs that follow many of the
recommendations of the Commission. 83
CONCLUSION

William A. McNeill, relating the devastating impact that smallpox
had upon the Aztec Indians, 84 writes that the psychological implications of a disease, which "killed only Indians and left Spaniards unharmed," enabled the Spaniards to prevail, not only militarily, but
culturally over the more numerous Aztecs. 85 His book concludes that
infectious diseases invading virgin populations are "capable of destroying or crippling entire human communities .... "8 6
Today the United States and many other countries have been invaded by a new deadly infectious disease, HIV. It remains to be seen
whether this country will allow the HIV epidemic to destroy the vast
network of civil rights and liberties laboriously developed over the
79. Mohr, Drog Bill Passes, Finishing Business of JOOth Congress, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988,
at AI, col. 6.
80. Molotsky, Congress Passes Compromise AIDS Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A12,
col. 1.
81. Id. The monies are to be spent for HIV prevention programs; to develop care and treatment networks, and accelerate research efforts. Included along with the AIDS measures was a
measure to alleviate the shortage of nurses.
82. Id.
83. Id. Specifically, over the next two years $100 million per year will be spent on testing
and the same amount will be spent for home health care for people with AIDS. Over the next
three years $285-300 million a year will be spent for research and $250-300 million per year will
be spent for education. Id.
84. W. McNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 1·2 (1976).
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 13. According to Dr. Allan M. Brandt, noted medical historian:
The manner in which a society responds to a disease, and especially to those in need,
reveals very deep and fundamental cultural and social values. A disease is shaped not only
by its biological qualities, but by its cultural variables as well. A disease can become a
symbol for ordering and explaining various aspects of human experience. Medicine and
science are not only affected by social, economic, and political variables; medicine and sci·
ence are, in fact, embedded in them .
• • . . Until we more fully recognize the ways in which social and cultural values and
attitudes shape medical, scientific and public health problems, it will be difficult for us to
deal with a problem as complex as AIDS in an effective and humane way.
Brandt, Historical Analogies to the AIDS Epidemic, in AIDS AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT:
LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 159, 163 (M. Witted. 1986).
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years to protect the outsiders of society from the tyranny of government and a fickle and fearful majority, or whether the epidemic will
result in a more equitable health care delivery system.
While the report is not perfect, it is a beginning for President Bush.
At the very least, the report probably prodded Congress to take more
decisive steps in stemming the spread of HIV. Perhaps over the next
four years, when approximately 365,000 people may become infected
with HIV, America really will become a "kinder, gentler nation," at
least toward people with HIV.
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